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STUDENT NOTE
Habeas Corpus Outside U.S. Territory: Omar v. Geren and Its

Effects On Americans Abroad
John Wright
ABSTRACT

The contention between habeas corpus rights and national security interests has been ongoing since the
ratification of the U.S. Constitution. History proves that this relationship becomes especially precarious
during times of conflict, from the U.S. Civil War and continuing through the War on Terrorism, which
began in 2001.
This paper focuses on one of the most recent limitations placed on the right of habeas corpus as
determined by the federal judiciary: that a writ of habeas corpus will not stay the transfer of a U.S.
citizen to a foreign sovereign’s authorities to face charges for alleged crimes committed within that
sovereign. The author looks at how this restraint fits within the greater historical framework of the
right of habeas corpus, as well as its recent evolution during the War on Terrorism. Lastly, it is
determined whether or not the individual challenging the transfer has any further options regarding the
appeal of his writ.
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INTRODUCTION
Habeas corpus, among the most fundamental and precious rights in our political system, remains a
crucial guard against illegal or unwarranted government detention authority. The Suspension Clause in the
United States Constitution dictates that, "The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended,
unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it."1 Barring extreme
circumstances, the clause guarantees an individual the right to come before a court to test the legality of an
arrest or commitment or obtain judicial review of (1) the regularity of the extradition process, (2) the right to
or amount of bail, or (3) the jurisdiction of a court that has imposed a criminal sentence.2 Despite this broad
constitutional constraint, the recent case Omar v. Geren, from the United States District Court, District of
Columbia, has established limits on the application of this right under specific circumstances, particularly
for situations in the context of the War on Terror outside United States soil.3

BACKGROUND AND EARLY CASE LAW
To fully grasp the implications of the District Court’s decision, one must first examine the right of
habeas corpus in general, both its origin and evolution through our nation’s history. A fundamental
instrument for safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state action,4 the writ of habeas
corpus is meant to provide for swift judicial review of alleged unlawful restraints on liberty.5 Indeed, it is a
wise decision to allow third-party review of governmental decisions, balancing institutional authority with
individual liberty.6 Consequently, legislation has been passed allowing courts to entertain applications for a
writ of habeas corpus.7 Upon review of such an application, the court must either award the writ or issue an
order directing the respondent to show cause as to why the writ should not be granted, unless it appears from
the application that the applicant or person who is detained is not entitled to such a writ.8
A. HABEAS CORPUS DURING THE CIVIL WAR
This safeguard, however, is not absolute. At its core, the American constitutional government balances
a constant tension between security and liberty.9 History provides multiple examples of habeas corpus
suspension on the basis of national security. To the great dismay of some legal scholars, the President of the
United States has utilized the constitutional power granted in the suspension clause to limit habeas corpus in
times of war.10 During the Civil War, President Lincoln suspended the writ of habeas corpus, resulting in the
military detention of more than 20,000 persons suspected of disloyalty against the Union.11 Though his
actions were deemed unconstitutional by one judge,12 Lincoln was not dissuaded from continuing.13
1
2
3
4
5
6

7
8
9
10
11
12

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 778 (9th ed. 2009).
See generally Omar v. Geren, 689 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 (D.C. Dist. 2009).
Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290-91 (1969).
Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 63 (1968).
Cf. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 545 (2004) (Souter, J., concurring) (“For reasons of inescapable human nature, the
branch of the Government asked to counter a serious threat is not the branch on which to rest the Nation's entire reliance
in striking the balance between the will to win and the cost in liberty on the way to victory; the responsibility for
security will naturally amplify the claim that security legitimately raises.”).
See Issuance of writ; return; hearing; decision, 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1948).
Id.
Hamdi, supra note 6, at 545.
Id. (“…deciding finally on what is a reasonable degree of guaranteed liberty whether in peace or war (or some condition in between)
is not well entrusted to the Executive Branch of Government, whose particular responsibility is to maintain security.”).
Frederic Block, Civil Liberties During National Emergencies: The Interactions Between the Three Branches of Government in
Coping with Past and Current Threats to the Nation's Security, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 459, 482-83 (2005).
Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 148 (1861) (Taney, R.) (“The clause of the constitution, which authorizes the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, is in the 9th section of the first article. This article is devoted to the legislative
department of the United States, and has not the slightest reference to the executive department.”).
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B. EX PARTE MILLIGAN–PROTECTION OF NON-MILITANTS
Upon the conclusion of the Civil War, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled on a pivotal issue
surrounding habeas corpus and military tribunals.14 In Ex Parte Milligan, the high court determined that a
military tribunal could not, at any time, try civilians or non-military individuals.15 The case centered on a
United States citizen and Indiana resident, Milligan, who was arrested and charged with, among other things,
conspiracy against the United States and inciting insurrection.16 The charges were brought as a result of
Milligan’s involvement with a secret society known as the “Order of American Knights” or “Sons of
Liberty,” that advocated overthrowing the Government and duly constituted authorities of the United
States.17 Tried and found guilty by a military tribunal, Milligan was sentenced to death by hanging.18
The Supreme Court ruled, however, the military commission in Indiana, under the facts stated in the case,
did not have jurisdiction to try and sentence Milligan.19 The court’s reasons for the denial of jurisdiction
stemmed from “the inestimable value of the trial by jury, and of the other constitutional safeguards of civil
liberty,” and the fact that there are relatively few exceptions that can be substituted for them.20 The Court
concluded by stating in emphatic fashion that it was, “unwilling to give [their] assent by silence to expressions of
opinion, which [seemed to the Court as] calculated, though not intended, to cripple the constitutional powers of
the government, and to augment the public dangers in times of invasion and rebellion.”21

IMPACT OF THE WAR ON TERRORISM
There have been more recent illustrations of the struggle over habeas corpus between the branches of
government. Since the War on Terrorism began in 2001, the Supreme Court has faced a myriad of habeas
corpus issues involving both U.S. citizens and foreign nationals. Significantly, these judgments have
established that the U.S. court system has the authority to decide whether foreign nationals (non-U.S.
citizens) held in any dominion under United States control are wrongfully imprisoned.22
A. THE QUESTION OF JURISDICTION
In Rasul v. Bush, the Supreme Court was presented with “the narrow but important question whether
United States Courts lack jurisdiction to consider challenges to the legality of the detention of foreign nationals
captured abroad in connection with hostilities and incarcerated at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba.”23
Petitioners in the case consisted of two Australian citizens, two British citizens and twelve Kuwaiti citizens
who were all captured abroad during hostilities between the United States and the Taliban.24 All three groups
of citizens filed separate writs of habeas corpus, and were construed together by the District Court for the
District of Columbia, which dismissed all three for want of jurisdiction, holding that “aliens detained outside
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

21
22
23
24

Block, supra note 11, at 483.
See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866).
Id. at 34 (“[M]ilitary tribunals for civilians, or non-military persons, whether in war or peace, are inconsistent with the liberty
of the citizen, and can have no place in constitutional government.”).
See id. at 6.
Id. at 6-7.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 135.
Id. (“And we concur, also, in what is said of the writ of habeas corpus, and of its suspension, with two reservations: (1.) That,
in our judgment, when the writ is suspended, the Executive is authorized to arrest as well as to detain; and (2.) that there are
cases in which, the privilege of the writ being suspended, trial and punishment by military commission, in states where civil
courts are open, may be authorized by Congress, as well as arrest and detention.”).
Id.
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 485 (2004).
Id. at 470.
Id. at 470-71.
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the sovereign territory of the United States [may not] invok[e] a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.”25 The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed, stating that “‘the privilege of litigation’ does
not extend to aliens in military custody who have no presence in ‘any territory over which the United States is
sovereign.’”26 The Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari to review the petitions.27
Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for the majority, determined that the right to habeas corpus can be
exercised by any individual, independent of citizenship status, in "all . . . dominions under the sovereign's
control," including the military base in Guantanamo Bay.28 Stevens argued that, given the express terms of
its agreements with Cuba, the United States exercises complete jurisdiction and control over the
Guantanamo Base, and may continue to do so permanently if it chooses.29 The majority found the fact that
ultimate sovereignty of the base remained with Cuba was irrelevant.30 Accordingly, the Court reversed the
lower courts’ rulings, holding that United States courts had jurisdiction over habeas corpus petitions from
non-citizens being held in any dominion under United States.31
The Court was divided concerning this ruling, with the Chief Justice and Justice Thomas joining
Justice Scalia in dissent of the holding. Justice Scalia argued that, because even a cursory reading of the
habeas statute shows that it presupposes a federal district court with territorial jurisdiction over the
detainee,32 United States courts do not have the jurisdiction to hear writs of habeas corpus petitioned by noncitizens. Scalia warned of the potential “breathtaking” consequence of this holding, as applied to aliens
outside the country, because it potentially permits “an alien captured in a foreign theater of active combat to
bring a habeas corpus petition against the Secretary of Defense.”33 Scalia’s final argument was that the
proper course of action would have been through Congress, which could have changed federal judges'
habeas jurisdiction from what the Supreme Court had previously held that to be.34
B. THE RIGHTS OF “ENEMY COMBATANTS”
In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, decided concurrently with Rasul v. Bush, the Supreme Court determined that
United States citizens who have been designated as enemy combatants by the Executive Branch have a right
to challenge their detainment via habeas corpus.35 This case developed from the detention of a United States
citizen, named Yaser Esam Hamdi, who allegedly took up arms with the Taliban against the United States.36
Members of the Northern Alliance, a coalition of military groups opposed to the Taliban government, seized
Hamdi and eventually transferred him to United States military custody.37 The Government contended that
Hamdi was an “enemy combatant,” and that this status justified holding him in the United States
indefinitely, without formal charges or proceedings, unless and until it makes the determination that access
to counsel or further process is warranted.38
Hamdi's father, Esam Fouad Hamdi, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of his son.39
The petition stated that Hamdi's detention was not legally authorized, that, “[a]s an American citizen . . .
Hamdi enjoys the full protections of the Constitution,” and that Hamdi's detention in the United States
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39

Id. at 472-3.
Id. at 473 (quoting Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 777-8 (1950)).
Id.
Id. at 481-2.
Id. at 480.
Id. at 485.
Id.
Id. at 489.
Id. at 498.
Id. at 506.
Hamdi, supra note 6.
Id. at 510.
Id.
Id. at 510-11.
Id. at 511.
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without charges, access to an impartial tribunal, or assistance of counsel “violated and continue[s] to violate
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.”40 Though the District court for the
Eastern District of Virginia ordered that counsel be given access to Hamdi, the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit reversed, stating that the District Court had failed to extend appropriate deference to the
Government's security and intelligence interests.41 The case itself bounced back and forth between the
district and circuit courts,42 with the Fourth Circuit eventually denying Hamdi’s constitutional claim,
emphasizing that “[o]ne who takes up arms against the United States in a foreign theater of war, regardless
of his citizenship, may properly be designated an enemy combatant and treated as such.”43
Writing for a plurality, Justice O’Connor wrote that, although Congress authorized the detention of
combatants in the narrow circumstances alleged here, due process demands that a citizen held in the United
States as an enemy combatant be given a meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis for that
detention before a neutral decision-maker.44 Absent suspension, the writ of habeas corpus remains available
to every individual detained within the United States.45 Even though the Supreme Court admits that it is
“beyond question that substantial interests lie on both sides of the scale in this case,”46 it noted that a state of
war is not a blank check for the President when it comes to the rights of the nation's citizens.47 Any process
in which the Executive's factual assertions go wholly unchallenged or are simply presumed correct without
any opportunity for the alleged combatant to demonstrate otherwise falls constitutionally short.48
Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg, concurred with the plurality so far as the fact that Hamdi had the
right to challenge his status as an enemy combatant in court, but disagreed with the view that Congress
authorized Hamdi's detention.49 Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Stevens, issued a dissent arguing that the
government’s course of action was constitutionally sound under the Suspension Clause.50 Where the exigencies
of war prevent the government from prosecuting a citizen accused of waging war against it, the Constitution's
Suspension Clause allows Congress to relax the usual protections temporarily.51 Scalia went on to state that the
Court proceeded to meet the current emergency in a manner the Constitution did not envision.52
Justice Thomas wrote a separate dissent, arguing that Hamdi’s detention falls squarely within the
federal government's war powers, and that the Court lacked the expertise and capacity to second-guess that
decision.53 Given that, “[i]t is ‘obvious and unarguable’ that no governmental interest is more compelling
than the security of the Nation,”54 Thomas believed that the plurality misapplied its chosen framework, “one
that if applied correctly would probably lead to the result [Thomas] reached.”55 Although Thomas admitted
that it was undeniable that Hamdi had been deprived of a serious interest, one actually protected by the Due

40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55

Id.
See id. (“[I]f Hamdi is indeed an ‘enemy combatant’ who was captured during hostilities in Afghanistan, the government's
present detention of him is a lawful one.”).
See generally id. at 512-16.
Id. at 516 (quoting Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
Id. at 509.
Id. at 525.
Id. at 529 (“Hamdi's ‘private interest . . . affected by the official action,’ is the most elemental of liberty interests-the interest in
being free from physical detention by one's own government.”).
See id. at 536.
Id. at 537.
Id. at 541 (“The Government has failed to demonstrate that the Force Resolution authorizes the detention complained of here
even on the facts the Government claims.”).
Id. at 554.
Id.
Id. at 579.
Id. at 580.
Id. (quoting Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307, (1981)).
Id. at 594.
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Process Clause, the Government possessed an overriding interest in protecting the Nation, which therefore
justifies such deprivation.56
C. REQUIREMENT FOR CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORIZATION
Since the landmark decisions in Rasul and Hamdi, the Supreme Court has utilized its universal power
to review writs of habeas corpus petitioned by both U.S. citizens and foreign nationals to address further
issues. In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,57 the Supreme Court determined, among other things, that neither an extant
act of Congress nor the inherent powers of the Executive enumerated in the Constitution expressly
authorized military commissions established by the Executive Branch to try detainees at Guantanamo Bay.58
Congress, in response to the September 11th terrorist attacks, adopted a Joint Resolution, the Authorization
for Use of Military Force (AUMF),59 authorizing the President to “use all necessary and appropriate force against
those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist
attacks . . . in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations,
organizations or persons.”60 Pursuant to the AUMF, the President ordered the Armed Forces of the United States
to invade Afghanistan, and hundreds of individuals, Hamdan among them, were captured and eventually
detained at Guantanamo Bay.61 On November 13, 2001, while the United States was still engaged in active
combat with the Taliban, the President issued a comprehensive military order intended to govern the “Detention,
Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism.”62 The order stated that those subject
to the order63 “shall, when tried, be tried by a military commission for any and all offenses triable by military
commission that such individual is alleged to have committed, and may be punished in accordance with the
penalties provided under applicable law, including life imprisonment or death.”64 Subsequently, the President
announced that Hamdan was subject to the aforementioned order.65
Hamdan filed a writ for habeas corpus demanding to know the charges he faced.66 The District Court
granted Hamdan's petition for habeas corpus and stayed the commission's proceedings.67 The Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, rejecting the District Court's conclusion that Hamdan
was entitled to relief under Article III of the Third Geneva Convention,68 asserting that the Geneva
Conventions were not “judicially enforceable.”69 Further, the appellate court concluded that there was no
56
57
58

59
60
61
62
63

64
65
66
67

68
69

Id. at 598.
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
Id. at 636 (“The Court's conclusion ultimately rests upon a single ground: Congress has not issued the Executive a ‘blank
check.’ . . . Indeed, Congress has denied the President the legislative authority to create military commissions of the kind at
issue here. Nothing prevents the President from returning to Congress to seek the authority he believes necessary.”).
115 Stat. 224.
Hamdan, supra note 57, at 568.
Id.
Id.
Id. (“Those subject to [the order] include any noncitizen for whom the President determines “there is reason to believe” that he
or she (1) “is or was” a member of al Qaeda or (2) has engaged or participated in terrorist activities aimed at or harmful to the
United States.”
Id.
Id. at 569.
Id.
Id. at 571 (“[The District Court] concluded that the President's authority to establish military commissions extends only to
‘offenders or offenses triable by military [commission] under the law of war;’ that the law of war includes the Geneva
Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War; that Hamdan is entitled to the full protections of the Third
Geneva Convention until adjudged, in compliance with that treaty, not to be a prisoner of war; and that, whether or not
Hamdan is properly classified as a prisoner of war, the military commission convened to try him was established in violation
of both the UCMJ and Common Article 3 of the Third Geneva Convention because it had the power to convict based on
evidence the accused would never see or hear.”).
6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364 (Third Geneva Convention).
Id. at 571.
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separation of powers objection to the military commission's jurisdiction.70 The Supreme Court subsequently
granted certiorari to determine whether the military commission convened to try Hamdan has authority to do
so, and whether Hamdan could rely on the Geneva Conventions in these proceedings.71
Justice Stevens, authoring the opinion, determined that, absent express congressional authorization, it
was the court’s duty to determine whether the military commission complied with the ordinary laws of the
United States and the laws of war.72 The Geneva Convention, as a part of the ordinary laws of war, was
applicable to Hamdan and required that Hamdan be tried by a “regularly constituted court affording all the
judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.”73 The military commission
that the President had convened to try Hamdan was found to violate the convention by not meeting its listed
requirements,74 and therefore was determined illegal.75
D. THE MILITARY COMMISSIONS ACT OF 2006
In the wake of the Hamdan decision, Congress enacted the Military Commissions Act of 2006
(MCA),76 which established procedures governing the use of military commissions to try alien unlawful
enemy combatants engaged in hostilities against the United States for violations of the law of war and other
offenses triable by military commissions.77 Further, § 7 of the MCA expressly eliminated court jurisdiction
over all pending and future causes of action other than the limited review permitted under the Detainee
Treatment Act (DTA).78 Congress's intent was explicit and broad–the MCA would eliminate all
constitutional guarantees of habeas corpus to all detainees designated as “enemy combatants” in United
States custody, no matter where they were held.79
This tension between the three branches of government came to a head in the case Boumediene v.
Bush.80 This case, brought by a representative group of aliens81 designated as enemy combatants and
detained at Guantanamo Bay, presented two questions to the high court: First, whether the aliens have the
constitutional privilege of habeas corpus, a privilege not to be withdrawn except in conformance with the
Suspension Clause;82 and second, if the aliens do possess the privilege, whether the Military Commissions
Act of 2006 operates as an adequate and effective substitute for habeas corpus.83 The Court of Appeals
concluded that MCA § 7 must be read to strip from it, and all federal courts, jurisdiction to consider
petitioners' habeas corpus applications, that petitioners are not entitled to the privilege of the writ or the
protections of the Suspension Clause, and, as a result, that it was unnecessary to consider whether Congress

70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78

79
80
81
82
83

Id. at 571-72.
Id. at 572.
Id. at 595.
Id. at 631-32.
Id. at 640.
Id. at 635.
Military Commissions Act of 2006, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006).
Id.
Id. (“No court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on
behalf of an alien detained by the United States who has been determined by the United States to have been properly detained as an
enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination . . . Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 1005(e) of the
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (10 U.S.C. 801 note), no court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider any other
action against the United States or its agents relating to any aspect of the detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or conditions of
confinement of an alien who is or was detained by the United States and has been determined by the United States to have been
properly detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination.”).
See id.
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
Id. at 732 (“There are others detained there, also aliens, who are not parties to this suit.”).
Id.
Id.
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provided an adequate and effective substitute for habeas corpus in the DTA.84 Subsequently, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari.85
Justice Kennedy, writing for a five-justice majority, determined that the Court of Appeals was correct
to take note of the legislative history when construing the MCA, and agreed with the appellate court’s
conclusion that the MCA deprives the federal courts of jurisdiction to entertain the habeas corpus actions
under review.86 However, the Court also held that the Suspension Clause of the Constitution has full effect at
Guantanamo Bay.87 Therefore, if the privilege of habeas corpus is to be denied to the detainees before the
court, Congress had to have acted in accordance with the requirements of the Suspension Clause.88 Because
the MCA did not purport to be a formal suspension of the writ, and the Government, in its submissions to
the court, did not argue that it was, the Court determined that the petitioners were entitled to the privilege of
habeas corpus to challenge the legality of their detention.89
In light of this holding, the question facing the court became whether the MCA accommodated the
Suspension Clause mandate.90 Although the Government argued there was compliance with the Suspension
Clause because the DTA review process provides adequate substitute procedures for habeas corpus,91 the
Court determined that the Government did not establish that the detainees' access to the statutory review
provisions at issue was an adequate substitute for the writ of habeas corpus, and that MCA § 7 thus effects
an unconstitutional suspension of the writ.92 The petitioners, in the Court’s mind, were invoking the
fundamental procedural protection of habeas corpus, a protection “designed to survive, and remain in force,
in extraordinary times.”93 Accordingly, the petitioners were to be entitled to the protections that a writ of
habeas corpus offers.94
E. MUNAF V. GEREN
This case centers on Shawqi Omar (the petitioner in Omar v. Geren) and Mohammad Munaf, both of
whom are U.S. citizens who voluntarily traveled to Iraq and allegedly committed crimes there.95 Petitioner
Omar voluntarily traveled to Iraq in 2002 and, in October 2004, was captured and detained in Iraq by U.S.
military forces, part of the Multinational Force-Iraq (“MNF-I”), during a raid of his Baghdad home.96 Omar
is believed to have provided aid to al Qaeda in Iraq by facilitating this group’s connection with other
terrorist groups, bringing foreign fighters into Iraq, and planning and executing kidnappings in Iraq.97
Omar’s wife and son filed a next-friend petition for a writ of habeas corpus on Omar’s behalf in the District
Court for the District of Columbia.98 After the Department of Justice informed Omar that he would be
referred to the Central Criminal Court of Iraq for criminal proceedings, his attorney sought and obtained a

84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91

92
93
94
95
96
97
98

Id. at 735-36.
Id.
Id. at 738-39.
Id. at 771.
Id. (quoting Hamdi, 542 U.S., at 564 (SCALIA, J., dissenting) (“[I]ndefinite imprisonment on reasonable suspicion is not an
available option of treatment for those accused of aiding the enemy, absent a suspension of the writ.”)).
Id.
Id.
See The Detainee Treatment Act, § 1005(e)(2)(C), 119 Stat. 2742 (“(i) whether the status determination . . . was consistent
with the standards and procedures specified by the Secretary of Defense . . . and (ii) to the extent the Constitution and laws of
the United States are applicable, whether the use of such standards and procedures to make the determination is consistent
with the Constitution and laws of the United States.”).
Boumediene, supra note 80, at 792.
Id. at 798.
Id.
Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 674 (2008).
Id. at 675.
Id. at 681.
Id. at 682.
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preliminary injunction barring Omar’s removal from United States custody.99 The United States appealed
and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the injunction.100 A single appellate
judge dissented, stating “[T]he District Court had no authority to enjoin a transfer that would allow Iraqi
officials to take custody of an individual captured in Iraq-something the Iraqi Government ‘undeniably h[ad]
a right to do.’”101
Petitioner Munaf voluntarily traveled to Iraq with several Romanian journalists to serve as the
journalists’ translator and guide.102 Shortly after arriving in Iraq, the group was kidnapped and held captive
for two months, and, after the journalists were freed, Munaf was detained based on the belief that he had
orchestrated the kidnappings.103 Munaf’s sister filed a next-friend petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the
District Court for the District of Columbia.104 The District Court dismissed the petition for lack of
jurisdiction, finding that Munaf was “in the custody of coalition troops operating under the aegis of MNF-I,
who derive their ultimate authority from the United Nations and the MNF-I member nations acting
jointly.”105 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed, distinguishing the prior
opinion in Omar on the ground that Munaf, unlike Omar, had been convicted by a foreign tribunal.106 One
appellate judge concurred in judgment, concluding that the District Court had improperly dismissed for want
of jurisdiction because “Munaf is an American citizen . . . held by American forces overseas,” but would
have still held that Munaf’s habeas petition failed on the merits.107 The Supreme Court subsequently
consolidated both the Omar and Munaf cases and granted certiorari.108
The United States acknowledged that both Omar and Munaf are American citizens held overseas in the
immediate physical custody of American soldiers who answer only to an American chain of command.109
Given those circumstances, the Supreme Court declined to preclude American citizens held overseas by
American soldiers subject to a United States chain of command from filing habeas petitions.110 The Court
then turned to the question of whether United States District Courts may exercise their habeas jurisdiction to
enjoin the United States Armed Forces from transferring individuals detained within another sovereign’s
territory to that sovereign’s government for criminal prosecution.111 Given that the consolidated cases
involve habeas petitions that implicate sensitive foreign policy issues in the context of ongoing military
operations, Supreme Court precedent dictated that the power of the writ should not grant the relief sought by
the petitioners.112
Petitioners Omar and Munaf argued that the writ should be granted in their cases because they have “a
legally enforceable right” not to be transferred to Iraqi authority for criminal proceedings under both the Due
Process Clause and the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring (FARR) Act of 1998.113, 114 The Supreme
Court determined, however, that the granting of such writs would interfere with Iraq’s sovereign right to
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“punish offenses against its laws committed within its borders.”115 The Court went further to state that such
a conclusion would implicate “not only concerns about interfering with a sovereign’s recognized prerogative
to apply its criminal law to those alleged to have committed crimes within its borders,” but also concerns
about “unwarranted judicial intrusion into the Executive’s ability to conduct military operations abroad.”116
Accordingly, the Court determined that those who commit crimes within a sovereign’s territory may be
transferred to that sovereign’s government for prosecution.117
The petitioners contended that these general principles of foreign policy should be trumped because
their transfer to Iraqi custody is likely to result in torture, arguing that their claims of potential torture may
not be readily dismissed on the basis of these principles because the FARR Act prohibits transfer when
torture may result.118 However, the petitioners did not assert a FARR Act claim in their petitions for habeas,
nor did they raise the Act in any of the certiorari filings before the Court.119 Accordingly, the Supreme Court
refused to consider the question.120
The habeas petitioners’ final argument to stay their transfer to Iraqi custody was that the
Government may not transfer a citizen without legal authority, and the United States bears the burden of
identifying a treaty or statute that permits it to transfer them to Iraqi custody.121 The Court, however,
rejected this argument, stating that Petitioner’s precedent “involved the extradition of an individual from
the United States; this is not an extradition case, but one involving the transfer to a sovereign’s authority
of an individual captured and already detained in that sovereign’s territory.”122 Further, because Omar
and Munaf voluntarily traveled to Iraq and were being held there, they are therefore subject to the
territorial jurisdiction of that sovereign, not of the United States.123
A unanimous court afforded American citizens held overseas by American soldiers subject to a
United States chain of command the right to habeas corpus.124 That same unanimous court, however,
held that habeas corpus does not require the United States to shelter such fugitives as Omar and Munaf,
who are alleged to have committed hostile and warlike acts within the sovereign territory of Iraq from
the criminal justice system of the sovereign with authority to prosecute them.125 Consequently, the
Supreme Court found that the petitioners stated no claim in their habeas petitions for which relief could
be granted, and those petitions should have been promptly dismissed.126

OMAR V. GEREN–THE CASE AT HAND
Supreme Court decisions on habeas corpus issues during the War on Terror period have generally sustained
the right to petition for both foreign nationals as well as U.S. citizens in a wartime setting. In contrast, Munaf v.
Geren disallowed the use of such a writ in order to stay a transfer to a foreign sovereign to face criminal
charges.127 Petitioner Omar, however, still believed that such a transfer could be stayed through a writ. Omar
subsequently amended his writ to include different arguments and filed, once again, in District Court.128
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A. FACTS OF OMAR V. GEREN
Petitioner, Shawqi Ahmad Omar, as aforementioned, is an American citizen detained in Iraq based on
his suspected role in facilitating insurgent activities.129 Omar’s wife and son commenced these habeas
corpus proceedings to prevent his transfer to the custody of Iraqi authorities to face the criminal charges.130
After receiving an e-mail from the respondents stating that "a determination was previously made to refer
[Omar’s] case to the Central Criminal Court of Iraq," counsel for the petitioner filed a motion for an ex
parte temporary restraining order to prevent the prisoner transfer.131
The District Court granted the motion for a preliminary injunction, and ordered that "the respondents,
their agents, servants, employees, confederates, and any persons acting in concert or participation with
them . . . not remove the petitioner" from United States custody.132 On review, the Circuit affirmed the
order granting the motion for a preliminary injunction.133
The Supreme Court subsequently granted the respondents' petition for a writ of certiorari and
consolidated the appeal with another separate petition for a writ of certiorari granted.134 The Supreme
Court vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded the case for further proceedings.135
Subsequently, the Omar filed an amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus, asserting claims under
the FARR Act, the Fifth and Eighth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, and the Citizen NonDetention Act (CNDA).136, 137
The amended petition asserts that the FARR Act implements the Convention Against Torture (CAT),138
which prohibits the government from transferring an individual to a country in which he or she will be
subject to torture.139 Omar also contended that his transfer to Iraqi authorities would violate his Eighth
Amendment right to be free from cruel or unusual punishment.140 This is because, under Iraqi law, he could
be subjected to the death penalty despite the fact that his alleged crimes did not result in any fatalities.141
Lastly, the petitioner asserted that his continued detention by the U.S. military violates the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment as well as the CNDA.142 The respondents moved to dismiss the amended
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the amended petition fails to state a claim on which relief
could be granted.143
B. THE FARR LIMITS JUDICIAL REVIEW
Respondents, in their motion to dismiss, asserted that the petitioner has no claim for relief under the
FARR Act because “the Act does not apply to a detainee who is already physically present in the nation to
which his transfer is threatened,” and also because “the Act precludes judicial review of claims under the
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Act except in the context of final orders of removal by immigration authorities.”144 In response, the
petitioner contended that 1) Congress’s inclusion in the FARR Act of the phrase “expel, extradite, or
otherwise effect the involuntary return” of a person to torture indicates its intent to “prohibit without
exception any transfer by U.S. personnel, wherever located, that ends in torture,” 2) the FARR Act does not
contain the clear and unambiguous language required to strip federal courts of habeas jurisdiction, and 3) the
Suspension Clause prohibits the court from construing the FARR Act so as to preclude habeas
jurisdiction.145
The CAT provides that,”[n]o State Party shall expel, return . . . or extradite a person to another State
where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture."146
The FARR Act implements the CAT requirements by providing, “[i]t shall be the policy of the United States
not to expel, extradite, or otherwise effect the involuntary return of any person to a country in which there
are substantial grounds for believing the person would be in danger of being subjected to torture, regardless
of whether the person is physically present in the United States."147 However, the Supreme Court determined
that the FARR Act limits the availability of judicial review of CAT claims to solely, “as part of the review of
a final order of removal pursuant to section 242 of the Immigration and Nationality Act.”148
C. THE REAL ID ACT OVERTURNS PRECEDENT
The petitioner, relying principally on Supreme Court precedent which has been followed by several
circuit courts, contended that, because § 2242(d) of the FARR Act does not contain a sufficiently clear and
unambiguous expression of congressional intent to limit judicial review of habeas petitions brought under
the FARR Act, that provision does not strip district courts of habeas jurisdiction over FARR Act claims.149
The court determined, however that the REAL ID Act of 2005150 supersedes the holdings in these cases,
providing, “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law, including . . . any other habeas corpus provision . .
. a petition for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals in accordance with this section shall be the
sole and exclusive means for judicial review of any cause or claim under the United Nations Convention
Against Torture.”151 The Court noted that it expressly determined that the REAL ID Act provision
eliminates habeas jurisdiction over FARR Act claims in the case Kiyemba v. Obama.152 As in Kiyemba, the
Court determined that the petitioner was not challenging a final order of removal, but was instead seeking to
enjoin his transfer to the custody of a foreign nation.153 Accordingly, the court concluded that the REAL ID
Act of 2005 precludes the court's consideration of the petitioner's FARR Act claims.154
D. SUSPENSION CLAUSE TRUMPED BY SEPARATION OF POWERS
Though the Court did not deny the petitioner’s claim that such a conclusion runs afoul of the
Suspension Clause because it would effectively “bar prisoners in such situations from pursuing any judicial
recourse to review the legality of executive actions regarding their detention,” the Court did state that it is
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bound by the holding in Kiyemba.155 The Kiyemba Court suggested that Suspension Clause concerns are
trumped by the separation of powers principles that preclude judicial second-guessing of the Executive’s
authority on matters of foreign policy and diplomacy.156 Accordingly, the Court ruled that the Suspension
Clause does not permit the Court from deviating from Kiyemba’s holding, which “precludes a court from
considering FARR Act claims asserted in a habeas petition.”157 Consequently, the Court granted the
respondents’ motion to dismiss the petitioner’s FARR Act claims.158
E. EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIMS DISCOUNTED
Omar also contended that his transfer to Iraqi Authorities would violate his Eighth Amendment right to
be free from cruel or unusual punishment since, under Iraqi law, he could be subjected to the death penalty
despite the fact that his alleged crimes did not result in any fatalities.159 The District Court for the District of
Columbia determined, however, that Munaf v. Geren barred the court from issuing a writ of habeas corpus to
protect the petitioner from the Iraqi criminal justice system based on the Eighth Amendment.160 As the
Munaf Court explained:
[T]he jurisdiction of a nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute . . .
This is true with respect to American citizens who travel abroad and commit crimes in another
nation whether or not the pertinent criminal process comes with all the rights guaranteed by our
Constitution. When an American citizen commits a crime in a foreign country he cannot
complain if required to submit to such modes of trial and to such punishment as the laws of that
country may prescribe for its own people.161
Omar himself traveled to Iraq of his own volition and Iraq plainly has the authority to prosecute him
for any crimes he committed within its sovereign territory.162 Accordingly, the Court held that the Eighth
Amendment does not afford Omar the protection that he seeks.163
F. FIFTH AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS AND CNDA CLAIMS DISMISSED
Lastly, Petitioner Omar asserted that his continued detention by the U.S. military violates the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the CNDA.164 The Court noted, however, that Omar asserted
both of these claims in his original habeas petition, which was subsequently dismissed by the Supreme Court
in Munaf v. Geren.165 The petitioner insisted that the Supreme Court did not consider the legality of the
petitioner’s detention in light of the fact that the FARR Act renders the threatened transfer illegal, and,
because of this, his Fifth Amendment and CNDA claims asserted in the amended petition should not be
dismissed.166 The Court was not moved by these arguments and found that because the FARR Act does not
provide a legal basis for prohibiting the petitioner’s transfer to Iraqi authorities, the petitioner fails to
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distinguish the Fifth Amendment and CNDA claims raised in this original petition and dismissed by the
Supreme Court on this ground.167 Because the Supreme Court adjudicated and rejected the two arguments
Omar was asserting, the court was precluded from reconsidering the two issues.168 The Court went farther,
stating that, even if it were to consider the CNDA claim in the amended petition, the respondents would still
prevail because the petitioner's detention is pursuant to congressional authorization.169 Accordingly, the
Court dismissed the petitioner’s claim that he was being detained in violation of the Fifth Amendment and
the CNDA.170

CONCLUSION AND IMPACT
The District Court granted respondent’s motion to dismiss pensioner’s amended writ of habeas
corpus.171 Shawqi Ahmad Omar, a U.S. citizen, can therefore be transferred to Iraqi custody.172 The District
Court’s affirmation of Munaf, when combined with its rejection of the FARR Act defense, leaves American
citizens abroad little habeas corpus protection against holdings and transfer to foreign authorities.173
Petitioner Omar has appealed the ruling, and the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals
subsequently affirmed the District Court’s decision, holding that, pursuant to Munaf, a transferee such as
Omar does not have a habeas corpus or due process right to judicial review of conditions in the receiving
country.174 Omar does not have many options for further petitions, as it seems unlikely that the Supreme
Court will overturn Munaf.175 While Congress is free to establish additional statutory protections with
respect to transfers,176 such action seems unlikely, given the fact that most congressional action in recent
history has resulted in a constriction of habeas corpus rights, rather than an expansion.177
Based on the aforementioned case law, the right of both U.S. citizens and foreign nationals to challenge
their imprisonment through writs of habeas corpus has been in a state of flux in recent years. The judicial
branch, however, has drawn a clear line concerning those persons who are being held in a foreign sovereign
for alleged crimes committed there.178 A writ of habeas corpus will not stay the transfer of that individual to
that sovereign’s authorities to face the charges for which he is accused.179 While the right of habeas corpus
remains broad, the District Court’s decision in Omar v. Geren, and its subsequent affirmation at the Circuit
Court level, has established that such petitions are not without limits. Current precedent makes U.S. borders
a crucial demarcation in habeas corpus application.
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